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Change and Feedback Systems 
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ABSTRACT 
Employee-based errors result in quality defects that can often impact customer satisfaction. This 
study examined the effects of a process change and feedback system intervention on error 
rates of 3 teams of retail furniture distribution warehouse workers. Archival records of error 
codes were analyzed and aggregated as the measure of quality. The intervention consisted of a 
process change where teams of 5 employees who had previously been assigned a specific role 
within the process were cross-trained to know and help with other team members' functions. 
Additionally, these teams were given performance feedback on an immediate, daily, and weekly 
basis. Team A reduced mean errors from 7.47 errors per week during baseline to 3.53 errors 
per week during the intervention phase. Team B experienced a reduction in mean number of 
weekly errors from a baseline of 11.39 errors per week to 3.82 errors per week during the 
intervention phase. Team C did not experience significant error rate reduction. 
 
 
ARTICLE 
Customer service is a key component of successful businesses. Customers 
consider the level of personal service they receive to assist in their purchasing 
choice across competing retailers. In addition to customer service, the quality 
of merchandise is an important consideration for customers deciding between 
retailers (Leung, Li, & Au, 1998). When customers pay premium prices for 
high-end products, they expect to receive a high quality, error-free product 
(Goering, 1985). 
 
In order to achieve the attention to detail required and to appease 
demanding and discriminating customers, quality control is essential 
(Bullington, Easley, Greenwood, & Bullington, 2002). Quality control helps 
to identify and reduce errors in products before they leave for delivery to 
the customer. Each aspect of the product is inspected and repaired as necessary. 
Without quality control, damaged and otherwise imperfect products 
may be delivered to the customer. However, quality control programs are 
not foolproof. Despite efforts to the contrary, some product errors make it 
past these inspection and repair processes that depend on employee behavior 
to detect and correctly fix errors. 
 
 
CROSS-TRAINED TEAMS 
 
Of the tasks performed in the workplace, some may be performed by individuals 
working together. When people interact with each other to complete 
specific assigned roles, a team is formed (Salas, Dickinson, Converse, & 
Tannenbaum, 1992). Within a team, members are able to utilize the collective 
ideas, knowledge, and experience each team member contributes. Most teams 
are composed of individuals with specific job functions within a linear work 
process whereby individuals depend on others’ functions to get their jobs done. 
In contrast, members of a cross-trained team are not just knowledgeable about 
their own duties and responsibilities; they are also knowledgeable and can 
perform their teammates’ job functions as well (Goldstein & Ford, 2002). 
 
There is scarce research on how and why cross-trained teams work 
(Volpe, Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Spector, 1996). Hollenbeck, DeRue, and 
Guzzo (2004) noted that there is a “science-practice knowledge gap” regarding 
cross-trained teams. Until recently, and due in large part to the lack of 
research, cross-trained teams have been regarded as counterproductive to 
team performance, serving only to duplicate processes and slow production 
time (Hollenbeck et al., 2004). However, among the few research studies 
performed, cross-trained teams were effective methods in employee organization 
(Volpe et al., 1996; Cannon-Bowers, Salas, Blickensderfer, & Bowers, 
1998; Marks, Sabella, Burke, & Zaccaro, 2002). 
 
When team members were cross-trained, as opposed to receiving taskspecific 
training only, teams tended to experience enhanced team functioning, 
especially engaging in more effective teamwork, team interactions, and 
communication processes. Additionally, cross-trained teams reported higher 
interpositional knowledge and maintained their process quality better than 
non-cross-trained teams (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1998; Volpe et al., 1996). 
Cross-trained teams responded better than traditional teams to high 
workload situations and were seen as a critical factor in team success 
(Cannon-Bowers et al., 1998). Research by Cooke et al. (2003) revealed that 
teams that were fully cross-trained had more task work and teamwork 
knowledge than control teams, resulting in higher team performance outcomes 
for the cross-trained teams. 
 
Marks et al. (2002) argued that when teams are cross-trained, they 
benefit from enhanced shared team-interaction models, or mental models. 
Cross-training allows performers to share a common understanding of the 
process or processes required to complete a task or set of tasks. Team 
members can then share such processes as coordination and backup (task 
assistance) behaviors that can be helpful in establishing opportunities for 
communication. 
 
It has long been established that teams require specific team process 
behaviors such as communication, leadership behaviors, coordination, and 
planning (Foushee, 1984; Stout, Salas, & Carson, 1994; Zalesny, Salas, & Prince, 
1995). Cross-trained teams are no exception. Organizations that adopt crosstrained 
teams without fully committing to the team process behaviors decrease 
their chances of success (Foushee, 1984; Stout et al., 1994; Zalesny et al., 1995). 
 
Cross-trained teams require open lines of communication in order to 
disseminate information among team members quickly and easily. When 
cross-trained teams fail, it is often because of the breakdown of feedback 
and communication systems throughout the team and process (Cannon- 
Bowers et al., 1998; Stout et al., 1994). One important component of this 
communication system is a feedback system that informs team members of 
their performance and errors. 
 
Improved feedback in cross-trained teams increases technical quality 
and excellence (Foushee, 1984; Stout et al., 1994). Feedback augments team 
members’ opportunities to discuss their performance and to learn about 
how their teammates perform their job. In the present study, team members 
participated in weekly meetings where team members received performance 
feedback on the previous week’s performance and discussed how to reduce 
errors further in the coming week. 
 
 
PERFORMANCE FEEDBACK 
 
Performance feedback has been used as a behavioral intervention strategy 
for many years (Alvero, Bucklin, & Austin, 2001; Daniels, 1994; Prue & 
Fairbank, 1981; Rummler & Brache, 1995; Sulzer-Azaroff & Mayer, 1991). 
Daniels (1994) defines performance feedback as transmitted information 
about past performance that gives the performer (or team) the opportunity to 
alter their future behavior. Balcazar, Hopkins, and Suarez (1985) conducted 
a review of 11 years (1974–1984) of performance feedback literature 
followed by an updated review by Alvero, Bucklin, and Austin (2001) in the 
years following (1985–1998). Both reviews indicated that the addition of 
rewards and goal-setting interventions to performance feedback helps to 
make intervention effects more reliable. Alvero et al. (2001) further revealed 
that more consistent effects were found when feedback was delivered at the 
group level as opposed to the individual level. 
 
Another consideration is the schedule with which performance feedback is 
delivered to participants. Performance feedback schedules have been delivered 
in various intervals, including but not limited to immediate, daily, and weekly 
delivery. The review of Balcazar et al. (1985) revealed that daily feedback was 
used in 54% of the performance feedback applications, and that daily and 
weekly performance feedback produced the most consistent effects at 42% and 
41%, respectively. Alvero et al.’s (2001) subsequent review found that the most 
frequently used performance feedback intervention schedule, representing 39% 
of the examined performance feedback interventions, was weekly performance 
feedback. The most consistent effects were both monthly performance feedback 
and a combined application of daily and weekly performance feedback. 
 
Despite the lapse in time between the event and the performance feedback 
delivery, weekly feedback can also be an effective feedback schedule. 
A study by Laitinen and Ruohomaki (1996) targeted teams of construction 
workers at two construction sites and their safety behaviors. With the implementation 
of the weekly public feedback, the aggregate safety index rose 
substantially. Additionally, several of the most critical safety subindexes 
(those including protection from falling, machine safety, scaffoldings, and 
personal protection devices) saw increases to nearly 100%. 
 
Daily performance feedback allows performers to gain knowledge of 
their task performance levels on a much more frequent basis than does weekly 
feedback. Pampino, MacDonald, Mullin, and Wilder (2003) examined the 
differences between daily and weekly performance feedback in a retail setting. 
When combined with an intervention package consisting of task clarification, 
goal setting, and access to reinforcement, weekly performance feedback 
increased the percentage of completed targeted secondary duties from 59% 
during baseline to 75% at the first setting and from 18% during baseline to 66% 
at the second setting. When the same intervention package was applied with 
daily feedback, the percentage of targeted secondary duties completed jumped 
from 75% to 91% at the first setting and from 66% to 86% at the second setting. 
These results suggest that daily feedback was more effective than weekly feedback 
in increasing the daily percentage of completed secondary tasks. 
 
It has been suggested that performance feedback may be most effective 
when that information is delivered proximal to the performance (Ludwig & 
Goomas, 2007). Immediate feedback provides participants information about 
their performance directly after engaging in the target activity and may alter 
how an individual performs the work following the feedback. Data presented 
in immediate feedback is typically not aggregated across time to include 
many behaviors or work tasks. Instead, it targets the specific behaviors exhibited 
during the completion of the task rather than the aggregate of the entire 
day’s process or work tasks. Finally, immediate feedback allows performers to 
correct any performance errors while the outcome is still under their control. 
In a series of studies (Berger & Ludwig, 2007; Goomas & Ludwig, 2007; 
Ludwig & Goomas, 2007), human performance technology was implemented 
at product distribution warehouses to provide employees with immediate 
feedback at the time they engaged in the targeted behaviors. The immediate 
feedback provided through these different technologies was associated with 
substantial increases in both productivity and quality. However, evidence 
from Goomas and Ludwig (in press) suggests that performance feedback 
can be aggregated beyond the work-unit level (i.e., at the point of the 
behavior) to an intermediate task-outcome level (i.e., at the conclusion of 
many behaviors of a work task) without decreasing the effectiveness of the 
intervention. Additionally, immediate feedback was found to aid the accuracy 
of error detection more than delayed feedback when participants were able 
to self-pace their activities (Mason & Redmon, 1992). 
 
Immediate performance feedback is not only effective, it is also popular 
among performers. Reid and Parsons (1996) found that when participants 
were asked to indicate their preference for receiving immediate or delayed 
feedback or no preference for type of feedback, 13 (of 16) participants indicated 
they would prefer to receive immediate feedback, no participants 
indicated a preference for delayed feedback, and 3 participants indicated 
that they had no preference. The same study revealed that when exposed to 
both immediate and delayed feedback, 100% of those who indicated a preference 
for feedback preferred the immediate over the delayed feedback. 
 
The purpose of this study is to reduce the number of errors committed by 
warehouse employees using a combined intervention of team training and 
feedback systems. In the present study, a combination of immediate, daily, 
and weekly performance feedback was used to reduce product errors in a 
furniture distribution company. Immediate performance feedback provided 
employee teams information on how many pieces per delivery site were 
error-free. Daily performance feedback constituted the presentation of the 
previous day’s average of products that were delivered without error. The previous 
week’s average was also displayed to serve as a basis of comparison. 
Finally, weekly performance feedback summed all the error-free products 
that originated from the team in the previous week. Additionally, data were 
collected on the source of any errors and this information was reported 
directly to the team so that discussions could be held regarding how to 
reduce the prevalence of these errors in the coming weeks. 
 
The combination of immediate, daily, and weekly performance feedback 
was chosen to provide team members, who had previously been unaware 
of their performance levels, an insight into their performance as well as to 
facilitate communication among the team members. 
 
Daily performance feedback allowed all of the immediate feedback data to 
be aggregated into a daily outcome measure. This aggregated outcome measure 
could then be compared to similar outcome data among other teams 
across the organization. In the present study, the daily aggregated outcome 
measure was “Percent of Clean Stops” and this outcome was used to compare 
teams across the warehouse to determine which team had the best clean 
stop to total stop percentage. The daily feedback also served as a benchmark 
for the individual teams, as team members could compare the team’s 
overall performance to the previous performance on a daily basis. Weekly 
feedback served a similar purpose as daily feedback in that it also served as 
an outcome measure. However, in this case, the weekly feedback provided 
the task team with regular opportunities to review, discuss, and make 
improvements to the work process based on the error incident information 
they had accumulated throughout the week. With the weekly feedback 
outcome measure, teams also compared their performance across several 
days and began to see any obvious trends, such as the tendency to commit 
a certain type of error with a specific brand or model of furniture. The combination 
of immediate, daily, and weekly feedback allowed team members 
to have both micro- and macro-level perspectives of their performance. It was 
expected that the transition to cross-trained teams, as well as the addition of 
the feedback package, would lead to a systematic reduction in errors across 
all three truck teams. 
 
 
METHOD 
 
Participants 
 
The current study was conducted at a retail furniture distributor located in the 
southeastern United States. The company filled orders of high-end furniture 
for customers from across the country. When furniture pieces were purchased 
by the customer at a retail outlet, the company ordered the pieces from 
vendors; the pieces were then shipped to the 256,000-square-foot company 
warehouse. At the warehouse, unloaders emptied the arriving tractor trailers 
of merchandise and inspected the pieces for missing items and damage. 
Pieces of the order were stored within the warehouse until the complete 
order, usually consisting of numerous furniture pieces, was acquired and 
readied for final delivery. When the final piece(s) of the order arrived, the 
furniture was located and pulled from the warehouse storage racks, grouped 
by delivery, and brought to the Deluxing Bay (D-bay). The furniture was 
then unboxed, assembled, inspected, and repaired before it was moved to 
the Staging Bay (S-bay) and wrapped for delivery to the customer location. 
(See Figure 1 for a warehouse map.) 
 
Participants in this study were employees working in the D-bay and S-bay 
and included Assemblers, Inspectors, Deluxers, and Loaders. These employees 
worked together to move items from the D-bay onto the truck and to the 
customer. Assemblers began the process by removing shipping materials 
and by completing any necessary assembly of the product. Then the inspectors 
scrutinized each piece in order to identify product defects and/or damages. 
 
 
When a problem was identified, the inspector tagged the problem with a 1 
centimeter-wide length of orange tape. Deluxers then repaired the imperfection 
marked by the tape. After all errors had been identified and repaired, 
pieces were wrapped and loaded onto the delivery trucks. 
 
Each member of the process depended on the other members to perform 
their jobs satisfactorily. If one member of the process failed to perform the 
job adequately, the team could send out a piece with a quality defect, thus 
failing in the warehouse’s ultimate goal of 100% clean pieces (i.e., delivered 
pieces of furniture without defect). 
 
Each piece of furniture was assigned a unique Unit Control File (UCF) 
number. This UCF number appeared on the order sheets and on all documentation 
pertaining to the furniture piece. Each piece was tagged with this number 
upon its arrival at the warehouse at inbound and stayed attached to the item for 
the life of the piece. Like a person’s Social Security number, this number held 
the history and specific information regarding a piece of furniture. Each UCF 
could be linked back to the individual employees who handled it in the warehouse. 
Therefore, individual employees (and the processes they missed) could 
be identified for their role in sending a flawed piece to the customer. 
 
 
ASSEMBLERS 
 
After an order was pulled from the storage racks and placed in the D-bay, 
assemblers removed the item’s shipping packaging, matched the UCF number 
stickers to the piece, verified that the piece pulled from the storage racks 
was actually the piece that needed to be delivered, and assembled the item. 
Assemblers used tools to open boxes and remove the furniture without cutting 
or otherwise damaging the piece. After the piece was out of the box, assemblers 
ensured that the piece was indeed the correct piece that the customer 
had ordered. Next they completed any assembly required. Assembly for all 
items was completed in the warehouse prior to delivery to ensure that all 
necessary parts and pieces were accounted for before the items left for 
delivery to the customer. Items such as bed frames were assembled within 
the warehouse, but later disassembled after they had passed all inspections, 
in order to allow them to fit onto the delivery trucks. 
 
 
INSPECTORS 
 
Upon assembly of the product, an inspector examined the furniture and 
other materials for defects and wear. Obvious errors included broken chair 
legs, deep surface scratches, ripped upholstery, etc. Less obvious errors included 
inconsistencies in surface finishes, dimples in wood, mismatched wood grains, 
elevated nail heads, imperfect seams on upholstery, etc. Upon discovery of 
these imperfections, inspectors marked each damage occurrence on the piece 
itself with a length of 1 centimeter-wide orange tape. The orange tape signaled 
to the deluxers the areas that were to be repaired before the piece could be 
delivered to the customer. 
 
 
DELUXERS 
 
Deluxers repaired and refinished any damaged or worn pieces that took less 
than 15 minutes to complete. Common repairs performed by deluxers were 
filling in scratches in product surfaces, rematching the color of finishes, and 
applying final layers of product sealant. They identified areas to repair by 
finding the pieces of orange tape the inspectors placed on the pieces. After 
repair, the piece was reinspected by the inspector and, if not in need of 
additional deluxing, moved from the D-bay to the S-bay to be wrapped and 
loaded onto the truck for delivery to the customer. 
 
 
REPAIR TECHNICIANS 
 
For more substantial or time-consuming repairs, the item was removed from 
the D-bay and taken to the repair technicians in the Repair Shop or Special 
Care area. Examples of such repairs include reattaching and finishing broken 
chair or table legs, reupholstering fabric pieces, and filling in deep gouges 
in the pieces. After the item was repaired, the inspector again examined the 
piece in the repair bay, and if it was satisfactorily repaired, the item was 
returned to the S-bay. 
 
 
LOADERS 
 
After all necessary repairs or touchups were made to the products, delivery 
items were moved from the D-bay to the S-bay. Here, items were grouped 
by delivery stop and staged for loading in the truck. Deliveries were staged 
such that the last delivery of the route was placed at the front end of the 
staging area so that it could be loaded first into the delivery truck. In the 
S-bay, loaders ensured this proper sequencing and grouped all pieces of a 
customer’s delivery together to reduce confusion and time spent finding 
items to complete the order at the delivery site. 
 
Loaders also blanket-wrapped each item that was put on the truck. This 
wrapping helped to protect the furniture from transit damage. After each piece 
was wrapped, loaders placed furniture on the truck, ensuring that the pieces 
were properly secured within the truck by restraining belts and platforms. 
 
 
DRIVERS 
 
A driver delivery team took the completed delivery orders to customers. The 
transit deliverers were responsible for driving trucks, unloading, and setting 
up furniture orders in customer homes and businesses. Transit deliverers traveled 
in teams consisting of a lead driver and a codriver per delivery truck. 
 
 
 
CUSTOMER SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE 
 
If any problems arose with the order process or delivery, a customer service 
representative (CSR) interacted with both the delivery team and the customer 
to handle and resolve complaints. CSRs contacted each customer to confirm 
the delivery and the pieces that were ordered and expected by the customer. 
Upon confirming the order, the CSR would verify with the floor-level workers 
that the correct pieces had been pulled and prepped for delivery. If necessary, 
the CSR would share the customer’s apprehensions regarding the delivery 
with the floor-level employees (especially if the piece had already been part 
of an attempted delivery and was being prepped for a second or third delivery 
attempt). This helped to open the communication lines and allowed the 
warehouse employees to be aware of specific customer concerns. 
 
CSRs could receive delivery success and problem information from 
both the drivers and the customers. They interpreted this information and, if 
necessary, assigned the most salient error code. Three processes were in 
place to ensure that all errors were accounted for. The first involved the 
delivery drivers calling the CSRs after each delivery. During this call, the 
driver would relay the number of pieces that were delivered successfully 
(undamaged) and the number of pieces that were damaged. If a piece was 
damaged, the drivers would log the piece’s UCF number so that it could be 
identified in the future. Second, errors could be recorded if an unsatisfied 
customer called the customer service department complaining of a defect 
after the driver had already left the delivery site. Finally, errors could be 
recorded when the inbound check-in worker inspected furniture returned 
to the warehouse. Each of these three systems worked in concert to catch 
and record the defective and damaged products. 
 
After receiving a problem notification, the CSRs then entered the 
assigned error codes, as well as all relevant information regarding the piece 
and the customer into the computer, where the data was aggregated into 
databases. Data regarding the error codes was transferred from the company 
to the research team via email. The databases used in this study contained 
weekly and daily records of error code frequencies, specific descriptions of 
the individual error(s), clean piece and clean stop ratios, trucks responsible 
for each delivery, driver names, and product UCF numbers. 
 
 
PARTICIPANTS 
 
The participants at the experimental site were teams (n = 3) of warehouse 
workers. Three teams were chosen to participate in this study because they 
provided a representative sample of the work processes that occurred within 
the warehouse. Examination of the three teams allowed the researchers to 
understand how team members typically interacted during task completion. 
The three teams included in this study were chosen from a list of the shortdistance 
load trucks within the warehouse. 
 
Each team was comprised 5 workers: 1 assembler, 1 inspector, 1 deluxer/ 
repair technician, 1 loader, and 1 CSR. The average age of the assemblers 
was 31 (range = 18 to 55) while average tenure with the company was 1 year 
(range = 1 month to 7 years). All 3 of the assemblers were male. The average 
age of the inspectors was 42 (range = 31 to 51) while average tenure with 
the company was 3 years (range = 2 months to 12 years). Of the three 
inspectors, 2 were male and 1 was female. The average age of the repair 
technicians was 46 (range = 22 to 63) while average tenure with the 
company was 5 years (range = 2 months to 18 years). Of the three repair 
technicians, 1 was male and 2 were female. The average age of the loaders/ 
unloaders was 31 (range = 18 to 53) while average tenure with the company 
was 3 years (range = 2 months to 12 years). All three of the loaders/unloaders 
were male. The average age of the CSRs was 40 (range = 27 to 60) while 
average tenure with the company was 5 years (range = 1 month to 25 years). 
Of the 3 CSRs, 1 was male and 2 were female. 
 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
The dependent variables in this study were reported defects in the furniture 
pieces that were delivered to customers. These defects were identified at the 
customer’s delivery site or reported within 48 hours of the time the delivery 
truck checked back in at the warehouse. These defects were recorded as a 
series of error codes that were tracked by the company. Ultimately, error 
codes could be tracked to the quality of work performed by each individual 
in the process. 
 
The organization maintained an extensive list of error codes allowing 
them to determine what went wrong with an item and who was accountable 
for the error. Of the 145 possible error codes, 12 were identified as directly 
attributable to the warehouse workers targeted in this study. Several of these 
12 error codes had similar themes, and, for the purposes of this study, were 
aggregated into seven categories: poor inspection, poor repair, wrong item, 
load damage, warehouse damage, missing parts or pieces, and soiled upholstery 
(see Table 1 for a description of the error codes used in this study). 
 
The assignment of the appropriate error codes was determined in three 
ways: (a) a CSR assigned the error codes as phone calls were received from 
the customers complaining about a delivered piece of furniture; (b) a CSR 
assigned the error codes as phone calls were received from drivers delivering 
the furniture and reporting a defect; or (c) the inbound check-in worker 
 
 
 
 
assigned the error codes upon inspecting furniture returned to the warehouse. 
Upon receiving a call from drivers, the CSR decided whether the 
piece should be left with the customer for an in-house repair or brought 
back to the warehouse for repair. The inbound check-in worker served as a 
checks-and-balances system for the first two error-reporting methods, as 
customers may have incorrectly identified the source of the defect and drivers 
may have misattributed or intentionally underreported errors to make themselves 
look better. 
 
The host company labeled a delivery of a furniture piece without any 
product defects as a “clean piece” and full orders without defects as “clean 
stops.” Clean piece percentages were calculated by the CSRs as the number 
of undamaged pieces delivered successfully to customers divided by the 
total number of pieces that went out on a truck for delivery in a given day. 
The clean stop percentage was defined as the number of clean stops 
divided by the day’s total number of attempted deliveries. If all but one of 
the pieces was delivered successfully, the stop was considered unclean. 
 
 
 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
The research design was an AB multiple baseline across groups. Three teams 
participated in the study. After a baseline period, implementation of the 
intervention was staggered across three groups in 4-week increments. Baseline 
for the Truck Team A was collected for 19 weeks. The process change 
and feedback system intervention was implemented with Truck Team A at 
the onset of the 20th week of the study. Truck Team B began the intervention 
after 23 weeks of baseline data (4 weeks after Truck Team A). Finally, Truck 
Team C began the intervention at the onset of the 28th week, allowing for 
27 weeks of baseline data and 7 weeks of intervention data. The intervention 
stayed in place for each team through the end of the study. 
 
The baseline phase consisted of employees (assemblers, inspectors, 
deluxers, loaders, and CSRs) working independently from their coworkers 
to finish their respective jobs as described above. Individuals performed 
only their duties as defined in their job descriptions and would wait for 
individuals whose job preceded them in the process to finish their task. At 
this point, employees would then perform their task on a given piece and, 
upon completion, pass the piece along to the job function that followed 
(see Figure 2 for a baseline process map). 
 
 
Intervention: Cross-Trained Teams and Team Feedback 
 
CROSS-TRAINED TEAMS 
 
After the baseline period, the first team (Truck Team A) changed their product 
preparation process to one in which each team member was trained and 
able to perform another employee’s function within the team (cross-trained 
team). Each team member was able to assist with another team member’s 
job duties and responsibilities. The team members initially performed their 
own jobs, as they did under the previous system. However, as they finished 
their individual tasks, the team members were able to begin to assist other 
team members who were finishing their tasks. For example, when the repair 
team member was finished repairing any items needing repair, he/she 
would assist the loader with wrapping the pieces. 
 
The CSR also came down to the floor during the product preparation 
process to inform team members of customer and piece history. For example, 
the CSR would inform the team if a customer was particularly picky or the 
piece had already been through a number of unsuccessful delivery attempts. 
This allowed special attention to be placed on the pieces that were determined 
to be possible problem pieces. The focus on communicating salient 
information allowed the pertinent information to be passed along to the 
team and the drivers and helped to reduce errors by focusing employee 
attention on previous and potential problems. 
 
 
 
 
Customer Order Feedback 
 
IMMEDIATE FEEDBACK 
 
After the driver called in to report the results of the delivery stop and the CSR 
informed the team leader of the clean stop percentages, the team leader 
would display this information on the whiteboard. This allowed the team to 
know their clean stop percentage with each customer delivery. This whiteboard 
displayed a list of the current day’s individual stops (by customer 
name) and a “Clean Customer” column. The sections of the board were taped 
off so that only the date and the numbers had to be changed every day. An 
example of the structure and data presented on this board is presented in 
Figure 3. The “Clean Customer” column was marked with a “100%” if the stop 
had no errors and the customer was satisfied. An air horn was sounded that 
was audible across the entire warehouse, including in the corporate offices. 
Each team had a different sounding air horn signal. If there was an error, the 
clean piece percentage was calculated and displayed. 
 
 
DAILY FEEDBACK 
 
Daily feedback was presented to the team via whiteboards that were placed 
next to the customer order feedback. Daily feedback consisted of clean stop 
and clean piece percentages for the previous day as well as the previous 
week’s clean stop and clean piece percentages. An example of the structure 
and data presented on this board is presented in Figure 4. 
 
 
WEEKLY FEEDBACK 
 
Weekly meeting feedback paper forms (see Figure 5) provided teams with 
information regarding their weekly performance from the previous week, 
 
 
 
 
 
how that performance related to the team’s performance data from 2 weeks 
prior, and the error codes that were most prevalent during the prior week. 
Team leaders received performance data from the Quality Manager and were 
trained regarding how to accurately read the database printouts in order to fill 
out the weekly meeting feedback form. Weekly feedback was presented during 
a team meeting attended by all team members at the beginning of the work 
week to review the previous week’s feedback. During this meeting, the team 
leader reviewed the weekly meeting feedback form covering the current and 
previous weeks’ clean stop and clean piece percentages. 
 
Additionally, a frequency count of specific error codes was reported to 
the team. This allowed the team to understand exactly where in their process 
any errors had been made. The causes of any errors were discussed and 
ideas were generated by the team regarding how to reduce unclean stops 
for future deliveries. Finally, the team members initialed the bottom of the 
feedback sheet, indicating that they were present and participated in the 
weekly feedback meeting. These signed feedback sheets were kept in a 
work drawer in the team’s area and copies of the forms were made for the 
researcher’s records. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Error Rate 
 
Three teams of employees participated in the 34-week project. These three 
teams were responsible for assembling, inspecting, repairing, and loading 
over 21,743 pieces of furniture for 6,902 different delivery stops throughout 
the duration of this study. Truck Team A made an average of 67.91 stops 
per week, accounting for an average of 3.31 delivered pieces per stop. 
Similarly, Truck Team B made an average of 70.03 stops per week, with an 
average of 2.97 pieces of furniture delivered per stop. Finally, Truck Team C 
made an average of 65.06 stops per week, and delivered an average of 3.18 
pieces per stop. 
 
 
 
 
In addition to mean calculations, effect size (Cohen’s d) statistics of the 
data were calculated. This produced a measure of the standardized difference 
between the two given means (Cohen, 1988; Howell, 2002). In his discussion 
of effect sizes and the magnitudes that must be achieved to attain relevance, 
Cohen (1988) proposed a rule of thumb for three levels of significance: 
small effect size = 0.2, medium effect size = 0.5, large effect size = 0.8. 
 
 
 
Please see Figure 6 for the aggregate error code frequency by truck. 
Results of error codes (n = 12) aggregated indicated a baseline mean for 
Truck Team A of 7.47 ( SD = 3.2; range = 2 to 12) errors per week. 
During the intervention phase, the Truck Team A aggregate mean error 
rate decreased to 3.53 (SD = 2.83; range = 0 to 9) errors per week. Effect 
size calculations revealed an effect size of d = 1.30 for Truck Team A. 
Baseline data for Truck Team A were characterized by high levels of 
variability from week to week. Intervention data appeared to be characterized 
by less variability, with low error rates immediately following 
implementation of the intervention, followed by slightly raised error rates 
for a period of 5 weeks during the middle of this phase, and finally stabilizing 
and reducing of error rates for the last 5 weeks of data collection. 
 
Truck Team B entered the intervention phase 4 weeks after Truck 
Team A. Truck Team B’s aggregate mean baseline error rate was 11.39 
(SD = 5.31; range = 4 to 26) errors per week. During the intervention phase, 
the aggregate mean error rate decreased to 3.82 (SD = 1.66; range = 1 to 7) 
errors per week. Truck Team B’s results were characterized by an effect size 
of d = 1.92. Truck Team B’s aggregate mean baseline error rate, similar to 
Truck Team A during the same phase, was highly variable with dramatic 
peaks in the error rates. Upon implementation of the intervention phase, 
the aggregate mean rate of errors per week immediately decreased and 
stabilized among Truck Team B. Truck Team B experienced a dramatic 
reduction in variance when the intervention was implemented. 
 
Truck Team C entered the intervention phase 4 weeks after Truck 
Team B. During baseline, the aggregate mean rate of errors in Truck Team 
C was 5.96 (SD = 3.45; range = 0 to 16) errors per week. During the intervention 
phase, the aggregate mean rate of errors was 6.00 (SD = 3.27; range 
= 4 to 12) errors per week. Effect size calculations revealed an effect size of 
d = -0.01 for Truck Team C. 
 
 
Cost Benefit Analysis 
 
A cost benefit analysis was performed to determine the value of the intervention 
program to the company. The only costs involved with implementing this 
system were the cost of the time to cross-train the team members, the lost 
work time for the weekly feedback meetings, and the cost of the dry-erase 
feedback boards. The new teams were cross-trained during regular shift 
hours. Because it was a linear process during baseline, the team members did 
not lose much production time during cross-training. An individual team 
member performed the work while the others observed. When one task was 
complete, the next team member in the process would demonstrate how to 
perform the specific job. The Warehouse Manager supervised this training. 
 
The weekly feedback meetings were also held during regular shift 
hours and took only 5 to 10 minutes, so the interference with productivity 
was negligible. With team members making an average of $13.90 an hour, 
5 team members taking about 10 minutes of their time to participate in the 
weekly feedback meeting, the estimated cost to the company was $11.58 per 
10-minute meeting. Each week, the weekly feedback meetings for Truck 
Teams A, B, and C cost an average total of $34.74. If the process change 
and feedback intervention was implemented across all 49 truck teams, the 
10-minute weekly feedback meetings would cost the company $29,514.33 
annually. 
 
Finally, the six dry erase boards used in this study cost approximately 
$20 each for a total cost of $120. If applied to the entire organization, the 
49 teams would each require two whiteboards, resulting in a one-time cost 
of $1,960 to purchase the feedback whiteboards. 
 
Benefit analyses were conducted individually for each truck, and again 
at an aggregate level across all three truck teams. Truck Team A experienced 
142 errors during its 19-week baseline. If this baseline rate of errors had 
continued during the 15-week intervention period, the total cumulative number 
of errors for Truck Team A would have been 254 errors over a 34-week 
period. With the intervention in place, the actual total cumulative number of 
errors was 195, resulting in a difference of 59 errors from the estimated 
number of errors. Analyses of financial information done by the Operations 
Manager of the host organization indicated that the estimated cost of an 
error was $4.87. The average savings experienced per week due to the 
errors caught and corrected by Truck Team A was $19.16. On a yearly basis, 
this truck alone would save the company $996.08 with the use of the intervention 
system. 
 
Truck Team B experienced even more substantial savings than Truck 
Team A. Truck Team B experienced 262 errors during their 23-week baseline. 
As part of the multiple baseline design, Truck Team B had a longer baseline 
period than Truck Team A. Due to this multiple baseline design, the raw 
count of baseline errors was greater for Truck Team B. However, Truck 
Team B also had a higher rate of baseline errors. If this baseline rate of 
errors had continued during the intervention period, the total cumulative 
number of errors for Truck Team B would have been 387. In reality, only 
297 cumulative errors occurred in Truck Team B by the end of the intervention, 
resulting in a difference of 90 errors from the projected cumulative 
number of errors to the actual cumulative number of errors. Again, with 
each error estimated to cost $4.87, the average savings experienced per 
week due to the errors caught and corrected by Truck Team B was $39.85. 
On a yearly basis, using the intervention system, Truck Team B would save 
the company $2,071.96. 
 
Truck C experienced 161 total errors during its 27-week baseline 
period, the longest baseline period of the study. If the baseline error rates 
had been extended to the end of the 7-week intervention period, the predicted 
cumulative number of errors for Truck Team C would have been 203. 
Unlike Truck Teams A and B, Truck Team C did not experience the same 
intervention effects as the other two teams when the intervention was 
applied. Because of this, the baseline rate of errors continued during the 
intervention phase, resulting in an actual cumulative number of errors of 
203 by the end of the intervention. There were no savings achieved by 
Truck Team C. 
 
Combined, Truck Teams A, B, and C realized average weekly organizational 
savings of $59.00. By using the intervention system, Truck Teams A, 
B, and C would save the company $3,068.04 annually. If the intervention 
system was applied to the entire warehouse, across all 49 truck teams, with 
the assumption that the results would mimic those of this study with 2 of 3 
teams having significant intervention effects, the company’s potential annual 
savings would reach $50,111.34. However, potential annual savings could 
be significantly higher, reaching $75,167.00 if the source preventing Truck 
Team C’s successful implementation of the intervention was identified and 
corrected, allowing Truck Team C to decrease errors at a rate similar to Truck 
Teams A and B. 
 
Considering the costs, the total annual net gain experienced by the 
organization could be $18,637.00 if the intervention is assumed to be successful 
on only two of three teams, or $43,692.67 if adjustments were made 
that resulted in significant error reduction across all teams. Additionally, the 
reduction in errors indicates an increase in customer satisfaction, as each 
reduction in the rate of errors represents an increase in the total number of 
satisfied customers. With the intervention in place, 149 errors were detected 
prior to customer delivery for Truck Teams A and B relative to baseline 
levels. On a yearly basis, this figure would reach 629 avoided errors. Across 
all truck teams, 15,410 yearly errors would have been prevented by the 
implementation of this training and feedback intervention. The reduction in 
errors itself is significant, but when we are reminded that each reduction in 
the rate of errors represents a customer who has received high-end furniture 
without having to experience a defect, the intervention becomes even more 
salient. 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The team-based cross-training and performance feedback intervention was 
effective in reducing the number of errors committed by the warehouse 
teams in 2 of the 3 teams examined in this study. After the intervention was 
implemented, the number of errors committed per week reduced dramatically 
in two Truck Teams, as the employees worked in cross-trained teams 
and received an abundance of performance feedback. This allowed Truck 
Teams A and B to reduce their already relatively low error rates toward their 
goal of near-perfect quality performance. 
 
To better interpret the results, it is worth noting that the host organization 
hand-selected the team members of Truck Team A so they would serve as 
an example to the other teams of how a team should function and demonstrate 
the possible success of the intervention. Additionally, researchers were informed 
(after the fact) that for nearly the first month after implementation, Truck 
Team A’s delivery load order had been manipulated to include easier pieces 
that were less likely to be associated with errors. This continued until Truck 
Team B entered the intervention phase in the 24th week. At this time, the 
number of errors committed by Truck Team A rose to baseline levels as more 
difficult pieces and deliveries were reintroduced to the team. Gradually, the 
team adjusted to this shift in demand and lowered and stabilized the number 
of weekly errors committed. 
 
The aggregate error code frequency comprised seven individual error 
code categories, each representing a different type of error that could be 
made by teams in the warehouse process. Across all three Truck Teams, the 
Poor Inspection error code accounted for nearly three-quarters of the total 
number of errors committed. Thus, overall error frequency mimicked Poor 
Inspection error frequency. 
 
Several explanations can be offered for the abundance of Poor Inspection 
error codes. The frequency of Poor Inspection errors may indicate that 
employees did not know how to properly perform the inspection tasks. The 
teamwork and feedback delivered in the intervention may have helped 
employees improve their inspection behaviors. If this were the case, more 
training may be necessary to ensure employees know how to inspect pieces 
for delivery properly. Secondly, the Poor Inspection error code category may 
have been used as a “catch-all” category for other problems. For example, if 
a customer suffering from buyer’s remorse decided to reject a piece of furniture 
and ask for a refund or simply did not like the piece, they may have 
complained that some aspect of the furniture was unsatisfactory such as the 
finish or direction of the wood grain. In this case the problem was more of 
a customer preference issue than a Poor Inspection error. However, if such 
a complaint were made, it could often have been recorded as a Poor Inspection 
error that should have been corrected in the warehouse. Although the 
researchers were assured that such occurrences did happen, it is impossible 
to determine how many Poor Inspection errors were attributed to customer 
factors beyond the control of the truck teams. 
 
In the weeks following the implementation of Truck Team B’s intervention 
phase, the sudden spike in errors committed by Truck Team A was reflected 
in both the Poor Inspection and Aggregate error code graphs. A similar, but 
less dramatic, spike in errors was seen in Truck Team B during the 28th 
week when Truck Team C began its intervention phase. However, in each 
case, after a few weeks, error rates began to decline. This may be indicative 
of a learning curve, where team members familiarize themselves with the 
new process. 
 
Because this intervention involved both cross-trained teams and the 
addition of layers of performance feedback, it is difficult to determine which 
technique was more responsible for the intervention effects. However, consistent 
with the studies of Volpe et al. (1996) and Cannon-Bowers et al. (1998), 
these teams may have benefited from enhanced task communication facilitated 
by the cross-trained team structure and weekly performance feedback 
meetings. Presumably, team members were able to examine the errors that 
had previously hurt quality and then communicate to fix the problems. 
 
The performance feedback components of this study were based upon 
the notion that more frequent performance feedback results in better 
performance (Alvero et al., 2001; Balcazar et al., 1985). Employee teams 
were provided with information regarding their performance, compared to 
previous days’ performance and current goals. When performance feedback 
was provided to the employees who had not previously received it, 
employees were more effective at their work tasks (see also Bailey & 
Thompson, 2000). 
 
This study allowed employee teams to receive performance feedback 
that was proximal to the performance behaviors. The immediate feedback 
allowed employee teams to receive feedback on behaviors they performed 
most recently, rather than behaviors they had performed long ago, and 
allowed them to adjust behaviors as the tasks continued to be performed 
(see also, Berger & Ludwig, 2007; Codding et al., 2005; Goomas & Ludwig, 
2007; Ludwig & Goomas, 2007). With the aid of this feedback, employee 
teams were better able to reduce the number of errors committed. 
 
Daily performance feedback provided a summative report of the day’s 
productivity and quality (Pampino et al., 2003). Additionally, the daily feedback 
allowed employee teams to compare their performance to the previous 
week’s performance. Because employee teams involved in this study were 
shift workers, the daily summative feedback allowed the teams to have a 
total picture of the previous day’s performance and a benchmark for the 
current day’s performance. 
 
The weekly performance feedback provided yet another summative 
report, on a wider scale, and provided opportunities for enhanced communication 
among the team members (Alvero et al., 2001; Laitinen & Ruohomaki, 
1996; Laitinen, Saari, & Kuusela, 1997). The weekly feedback provided 
employee teams an opportunity to review their previous week’s performance, 
identify trends, and overtly discuss ways to reduce the number of errors relative 
to the previous week. 
 
All three of these performance feedback applications worked in concert to 
provide the teams with up-to-date information on their performance and to 
provide communication opportunities. 
 
 
Limitations 
 
There are several limitations that may require the findings of this study be 
viewed with caution. First, the membership of Truck Team A was selected 
by the organization’s management. In Truck Team B and C, team member 
assignment was random. Truck Team A was composed of the best individual 
workers within the organization and special care was taken to ensure 
the early success of Truck Team A. Such team manipulation may have 
skewed the error rates of Truck Team A lower than that of the average truck 
team. 
 
Another limitation is the use of a bundled intervention. Because both the 
cross-trained team and performance feedback components of the intervention 
were implemented as a bundle, it is impossible to discern the extent to which 
each of the interventions contributed to the overall success of the study. If 
only one, rather than both in concert, of the interventions was the main driver 
behind the success of the intervention, it would be impossible to determine 
whether both were worthy of the effort and resources associated with implementation. 
 
A third limitation was the relatively short length of the intervention 
phase for Truck Team C. This team’s intervention phase lasted only 7 weeks, 
as opposed to the 15- and 11-week intervention phases for Truck Teams A 
and B, respectively. This short intervention phase did not allow for a 
reliable analysis of the effects of the intervention on Truck Team C. A 
longer intervention phase would have allowed the researchers to examine 
any trends in the data such as the learning curve seen in the other truck 
teams. Truck Team C’s lack of immediate reduction in errors may have 
occurred because they did not have adequate time to experience the intervention 
before data collection ceased. 
 
It should be noted that while researcher observation ceased after week 
34 of the study, the intervention stayed in place for all truck teams. However, 
examination of the intervention effects could not continue after week 34 
because the host organization suddenly and unexpectedly changed the 
measurement system that was used to capture the necessary data. Some 
individual error codes were carried through to the next system while others 
were altered or dropped completely from use. Because this new measurement 
system was not consistent with the old system, any comparisons 
between the two would be erroneous. 
 
While the intervention in this study was successful in reducing error 
rates among the targeted truck teams, the successes experienced by these 
three teams may not generalize to the other truck teams working in the 
facility. The three teams examined in this study were all similar in size, 
volume, and trip delivery distance. The truck teams that participated in 
this study were associated with short-distance deliveries. Truck teams 
associated with different delivery variables, such as longer trip delivery 
distances, may not experience the same benefits as the trucks used in this 
study. If this were the case, analyses should be performed to determine 
what intervention would be successful in facilitating performance 
improvement under different scenarios. 
 
Because this experiment took place in a functioning warehouse environment, 
it was impossible to completely prevent other teams from gaining 
knowledge of the intervention prior to receiving it. Diffusion of the intervention 
may have occurred between Team A and Teams B and C prior to 
the intended acquisition of the intervention by those teams. Because teams 
throughout the warehouse, including Teams B and C, were able to observe 
the formation and work process of the cross-trained team(s) working to 
reduce errors, and because the intervention resulted in reduced errors, 
other teams may have prematurely begun to model some of the behaviors 
of the teams already engaged in the intervention. This would have cast 
doubt upon the actual intervention start date for Teams B and C. If diffusion 
of the intervention had occurred, the actual start of the intervention for 
Teams B and C could have been earlier than the specified implementation 
date. 
 
Finally, because the teams were already fairly successful at catching 
errors during the baseline phase, a floor effect may have limited the intervention 
impact. All the teams studied had relatively low numbers of errors 
relative to the total number of pieces handled per week. Thus, a further 
reduction in errors would have been more difficult to achieve than if the 
teams had all started with higher weekly error rates. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Future studies should consider extending the intervention duration to determine 
whether or not these effects could be sustained on a long-term basis. 
Furthermore, researchers should consider the addition of incentive systems 
for teams in this study. The bank of incentive system literature indicates that 
when incentive systems are incorporated, results can be even more dramatic 
(Bucklin & Dickinson, 2001; Bucklin, McGee, & Dickinson, 2003; Dickinson & 
Gillette, 1993; Matthews & Dickinson, 2000; Stoneman & Dickinson, 1989). 
Such applications could further reduce and eliminate errors across teams 
while contributing to employee buy-in to the system. Additionally, future 
research should include component analysis research on team process components 
of interventions. 
 
The purpose of this study was to reduce the number of errors committed 
by teams of workers in a furniture distribution warehouse. During the initial 
planning phases of the study, the researchers noted that teams were all already 
fairly proficient at producing mostly error-free products. However, management 
wanted their customer service to approach perfection. Throughout the 
intervention phase, perfection was celebrated by both the teams and the 
executives. Teams were also constantly reminded by company managers of 
the company’s goal of 100% quality. Additionally, teams were given air horns to 
sound upon the attainment of a clean stop, a stop with no errors. When an 
air horn was sounded, it was not uncommon to observe the Executive Vice 
President of Operations, whose second-floor windowed office was located 
in the middle of the warehouse floor, jumping up with excitement at the 
sound of the horn and pumping his fists in the air to salute the error-free 
delivery. 
 
The intervention package of cross-trained teams and multiple forms of 
performance feedback produced a marked change in two of the truck 
teams. The intervention reduced the total number of errors committed and 
helped the organization come closer to attaining its goal of 100% quality. 
However, because the human element is involved, the question becomes 
not how to achieve perfection, but rather, can perfection in an environment 
controlled by human elements ever be fully attained and sustained. 
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